This model explores the consequences of common theoretical hypotheses and empirical stylized facts regarding innovation, knowledge development and knowledge management by geographically clustered, boundedly rational rival firms. Its most innovative feature is that it assumes that the market performance of innovations can be predicted by their ability to bridge between existing pieces of knowledge.
Introduction
Bounded rationality was originally proposed by H. Simon as an alternative framework to utility maximization in decision sciences. In its original formulations, bounded rationality was made of two parts: (a) some limitation on human cognitive abilities, and (b) an uncertain environment that would generate unlimited novel events (Simon, 1945) . However, since in the 1950s it was generally assumed that human brains work just like computers, Simon expressed (a) in terms of limitations on computational abilities (Simon, 1972) . Furthermore, point (b) was somehow less emphasized than (a) -indeed, it does not appear in the very expression 'bounded rationality.'
These unfortunate circumstances enabled utility maximization to distort, include and ultimately destroy the concept of bounded rationality. Since point (b) was not emphasized, it was relatively easy to drop it altogether. Just assume that decision-makers face a given set of alternatives, as utility maximization does. And since (a) was expressed in computational terms, it was possible to reduce "bounded rationality" to a constraint in utility maximization.
According to this interpretation bounded rationality would simply mean that decision-makers, when maximizing their utilities on a given set of alternatives, may face computational constraints that impair them to reach the optimum.
However, some scholars claim that this reduction of bounded rationality to mainstream theory is most unfortunate (Grandori, 1984) . In particular, we make the point that bounded rationality is most interesting, useful and effective when combined with uncertainty on the possibilities that decision-makers envisage (variously called "ontological uncertainty", "true uncertainty", "Keynesian uncertainty", or "uncertainty vs. risk" in the literature), and that technological innovation is possibly the most important source of novel, unexpected possibilities in modern economies (Lane and Maxfield, 2005) . Embracing this view, we set out to build a model of knowledge development where both bounded rationality and innovation would have a role.
We created an artificial simulation environment where small rival firms prosper or go bankrupt while developing their knowledge through innovation and imitation favoured by geographical proximity. This technique, known as agent-based modelling, is technically similar to computer games where fictional agents interact in a virtual reality. Its purpose is to generate sufficiency proofs for the assumptions of the model, i.e., showing that those assumptions are sufficient to obtain certain outcomes (Epstein, 1999) . In particular, our model has the purpose of creating an artificial world where economic actors make decisions according to assumptions that can be either found in the theoretical literature, or inferred from it. If our model is able to show that these assumptions are sufficient to reproduce certain empirical regularities, it lends support to their legitimacy.
However, our research is still in progress. Thus, at this stage we prefer to focus on the rationale of our model rather than making bold statements on results that still need to be checked. In particular, the ensuing section illustrates the assumptions of our model. Subsequently, we list the empirical regularities emerging from previous investigations of geographically clustered firms operating in the same industry. Finally, in the concluding section we discuss the place of our model within the framework of economics and management science.
The Assumptions
Our model rests on assumptions that concern the following domains:
1. The representation of knowledge;
2. The evaluation of knowledge;
3. Bounded rationality and geographical distance;
4. Firm strategies.
The rest of this section discusses the assumptions that we made in each of these domains. A subsection is devoted to each of them.
The Representation of Knowledge
We assumed that knowledge articulates into knowledge fields. Each knowledge field spans two or more business elements (e.g., a product, a market, a production technology, a marketing technique, an organizational form, etc.).
Knowledge fields are practised with a certain expertise. Each firm generally extends its knowledge over several knowledge fields, each of them with varying levels of expertise. And, conversely, different firms may extend their knowledge over the same knowledge field (i.e., the same combination of a product, a market, etc.) though possibly with different levels of expertise.
Figure
(1) illustrates knowledge fields as parallelepipeds composed by two business elements, e.g., a product and a market. Their height represents expertise. The number of business elements spanned by knowledge fields is a parameter of the model. If this parameter is set to 2, then all knowledge fields span two business elements (i.e., products and markets). Likewise, if this parameter is set to 3 all knowledge fields span three business elements (products, markets and technologies), and so on.
The cognitive distance between two knowledge fields is measured by the fraction of different business elements. For instance, suppose that all knowledge fields span two business elements (e.g., products and markets). Two knowledge fields that cover the same product but different markets (or the same market but different products) have cognitive distance ½. Likewise, if knowledge fields cover three business elements (e.g., products, markets and technologies), and if two knowledge fields share the same market and the same technology but they focus on different products, then their cognitive distance is 1/3. Figure ( 2) illustrates these examples. Figure 2 . Examples of cognitive distances between two knowledge fields. Left, knowledge fields span two business elements. Right, knowledge fields span three business elements.
In our model, cognitive distance and performance are the determinants of strategic decisions.
This will be made clear in §2.4.
The Evaluation of Knowledge
The evaluation of firms performance constitutes the most innovative aspect of our model. We noticed that several empirical accounts of the processes by which certain firms arrived at making innovations stress that they began by stretching available knowledge into unknown territories (Nooteboom, 2010) , eventually meeting unexpected usages of their original knowledge when they touched other, previously unrelated knowledge (Drucker, 1985) . Some authors even speak of exaptation, mutuating a term from evolutionary theory (Dew et al., 2004; Villani et al., 2007; Andriani and Cohen, 2013) . Others provide empirical evidence that the most innovative firms are also those which are better able at entertaining relations with many, and diverse, other firms (Gemünden et al., 1996; Gemünden, 2003, 2004) .
We felt that these insights suggested an innovative perspective on the evaluation of innovations which could be profitably employed in our model. We enabled our model to generate a knowledge network, subsuming all knowledge that is available in our artificial economy at any given point in time. In this network, nodes represent knowledge fields. Two nodes are linked if they cover the same product, or the same market, or else. Note that, since the aim is merely assessing the value of knowledge, this network exists independently of which firms own what knowledge fields. If replicas of a certain knowledge field are owned by different firms, all these knowledge fields are condensed into one node in the knowledge network. And if knowledge fields cover three or moret business elements, two nodes are linked if they share at least one business element. Figure (3) illustrates an instance of a knowledge network generated by our model under the assumption that knowledge fields cover two business elements only. Figure 3 . A knowledge network generated by assuming that knowledge fields span two business elements, e.g., products and markets. Blue edges connect knowledge fields that share the same product whereas yellow edges connect knowledge fields that share the same market. We assumed that the success of innovations depend on their ability to link between existing, yet previously unrelated pieces of knowledge. Examples may range from the automobile, which linked technical knowledge about combustion engines to the availability of better roads constructed for coaches and the demand for travelling created by railroads, to the iPhone and its derivatives, which unite the functionalities of old-style cellular phones, digital cameras, video-cameras, electronic agendas, watches, alarms and tape-recorders in one single object that connects previously unrelated markets.
In network science, a node with high betweeness centrality has a large influence on the transfer of information through the network. The betweeness centrality of a node v is equal to the number of shortest paths from all nodes to all others that pass through v:
is the number of shortest paths from node s to node t and is the number of those paths that pass through v. The sum extends over all s, t.
In our model, knowledge fields contribute to firm performance according to their betweeness centrality in the knowledge graph. More specifically, we employed the Brandes (2001) algorithm for its computation.
Bounded Rationality and Geographical Distance
Geographical clustering is a recurrent pattern in many industries and, allegedly, a key factor in firms' ability to imitate and innovate. One of the purposes of our model is that of investigating which conditions may eventually provide advantages to geographically clustered firms.
We assumed that geographical distance does not affect a firm's awareness that its competitors own certain knowledge fields -each firm can easily know what products other firms produce, in which markets they sell them, which technologies they use, etc. (Malmberg and Maskell, 2002) . What is harder for them to know are the technical specifications of their competitors'
products, or what they did in order to enter specific markets, or the details of their production processes (Bogner and Thomas, 1993; Boari et al., 2003) . In other words, competitors' expertise is difficult to acquire. We assumed that firms' ability to acquire their competitors' expertise is inversely proportional to geographical distance. The further a competitor, the smaller the fraction of its expertise that firms can acquire.
Boundedly rational firms cannot focus their attention on all of their competitors. Given their limited cognitive abilities, they rather monitor just a few rivals (Porac et al., 1995; Baum and Korn, 1996) . According to empirical investigations, rivals are generally a few units, always less than a dozen, and most of them are geographically close (Boari et al., 2003) .
In our model, competitors are those firms that share at least one knowledge field. Among them, rivals are selected. We assumed that firms cannot make a larger cognitive effort than specified by an exogenous parameter in order to monitor rivals and, most importantly, that the cognitive effort required for monitoring a rival is proportional to its geographical distance.
Thus, firms can either spend their cognitive effort in order to monitor a number of proximate rivals, or a few distant rivals or, most likely, a combination of both.
Note that in our model firms trade off bounded rationality with geographical distance. Since monitoring proximate rivals is easier than monitoring distant ones, geographical proximity simplifies the cognitive task of monitoring a few key rivals in order to stay up-to-date with industry developments.
We assume that firms combine the information they receive from their rivals, exploring novel combinations of available possibilities (Schumpeter, 1912) . For instance, observation of a rival selling product A in market B whereas another rival is selling product A in market C may suggest that product A could be profitably sold in a novel market. In order to implement this recombination of possibilities we assumed that firms subsume all information they receive from their rivals in a compound knowledge which entails all knowledge fields of rivals' knowledge as well as those originating from their intersections. These intersections are incomplete -for instance, the above example would yield an incomplete knowledge field entailing product A but no market -but they can contribute to knowledge development nonetheless (see Vicarious Exploration in the ensuing §2.4). Their expertise of incomplete knowledge fields is computed by means of Dempster-Shafer's combination rule, which weights the expertise of intersecting knowledge fields with the extent of their intersection and discounts the presence of non-intersecting knowledge fields (Shafer, 1976) . The rationale behind this rule is that the expertise of intersecting knowledge fields is: (a) the more valuable, the more business elements they have in common, and (b) the more valuable, the more coherently rivals' knowledge points to it (Fioretti, 2009 ). The mathematical expression of Dempster-Shafer's rule is:
denote the expertise associated with the intersecting knowledge fields , whereas is the resulting, incomplete knowledge field.
Rivals' compound knowledge is eventually used in order to improve one's own knowledge.
However, bounded rationality eventually limits firms' ability to improve their knowledge base.
Following research on mental storage capacity, we set at 5 the maximum number of knowledge fields that a firm can own and develop at any point in time (Miller, 1956; Cowan, 2000) . This is a second point where bounded rationality enters our model. However, it is understood that the model should be operated with parameter values such that this threshold is only occasionally reached.
Firm Strategies
By crossing the distinction between exploration of novel knowledge vs. exploitation of existing knowledge (March, 1991) with the distinction between experiential and vicarious learning (e.g., Shrivastava, 1983) we obtained the following behavioural strategies, also illustrated in figure (4):
• With Experiential Exploration a firm creates novel knowledge out of mutation of its own knowledge;
• With Vicarious Exploration a firm creates knowledge which is novel for itself, but out of imitation of another firm's knowledge;
• With Experiential Exploitation a firm increases its expertise on its own knowledge out of its own efforts;
• With Vicarious Exploitation a firm increases its expertise on its own knowledge by drawing on another firm's knowledge. Decision between these four possibilities is made according to common hypotheses to be found in the literature, based on economic performance (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985;  Swaminathan and Delacroix, 1991) and cognitive distance (Nooteboom, 1992 (Nooteboom, , 1999 With each of the above strategies, firms increase their expertise. However, we also assumed that expertise decreases linearly with time. Consequently, the expertise of those knowledge fields that are seldom used decreases until they disappear.
Our model can generate two classes of firms: the Innovators, which are able to undertake all four strategies mentioned above, and the Imitators which limit themselves to vicarious learning. Henceforth, the algorithms by which our firms make their decision are detailed.
Experiential Exploration
Experiential exploration means that a firm creates a knowledge field that is novel for the whole economy. Only Innovators can carry out experiential exploration.
Novel knowledge fields are generated by mutating at least one business element of an existing knowledge field. A parameter specifies how many business elements are mutated.
During one simulation step experiential exploration is attempted on each knowledge field of each firm. It is carried out if:
• A knowledge field has a high cognitive distance from all knowledge fields of rivals´ compound knowledge (it cannot be improved by imitation);
• Its performance is lower than the lowest among the last 10 performances of its firm.
The expertise of the newly created knowledge field is a random number in the interval between zero and the expertise of the knowledge field from which the novel knowledge field originates. If creation of a novel knowledge field makes a firm exceed the upper threshold allowed -which is set at 5 -then the knowledge field with lowest expertise is eliminated.
Experiential Exploitation
Experiential exploitation means that a firm increases the expertise of its knowledge fields out of its own efforts. Rivals play no role.
Only Innovators can carry out experiential exploitation. During one simulation step experiential exploitation is attempted on each knowledge field of each firm. It is carried out if:
At each simulation step, the expertise of knowledge fields is decreased by an amount that is equal to a percentage of the highest expertise they ever attained. Experiential exploitation has the effect of balancing this decay.
Vicarious Exploration
Vicarious exploration means that a firm imitates its rivals by creating a knowledge field that its rivals have, but which is novel for itself. Both Innovators and Imitators carry out vicarious exploration.
During one simulation step experiential exploration is attempted, for each firm, on each knowledge field of rivals' compound knowledge. It is carried out if:
• A firm lacks the knowledge field currently examined in its rivals´ compound knowledge;
• This knowledge field is at intermediate cognitive distance from at least one knowledge field of the firm;
• A firm either has less knowledge fields than the maximum allowed (this parameter is usually set to 5), or among its knowledge field there is at least one which has lower expertise than the knowledge field to be acquired from rivals´ compound knowledge.
In this last case, this knowledge field is deleted.
Vicarious Exploitation
Vicarious exploitation means that a firm imitates its rivals by improving the expertise of its knowledge fields drawing from the expertise of the knowledge fields in its rivals´ compound knowledge. The expertise of rivals´ compound knowledge is absorbed to an extent proportional to the similarity between the knowledge field of the rival´s compound knowledge and the knowledge field of the acting firm. Both Innovators and Imitators carry out vicarious exploitation.
During one simulation step, the method implementing vicarious exploitation is called by a firm so many times as the number of its own knowledge fields multiplied by the number of knowledge fields of its rivals´ compound knowledge. Vicarious exploitation is carried out if:
• The cognitive distance between each pair of knowledge fields is either low or intermediate;
• The expertise of the knowledge field in the rivals' compound knowledge is greater than the expertise of the receiving knowledge field.
If these conditions are satisfied, then expertise is increased by an amount equal to the difference of the depths (expertise levels) of the two fields multiplied by a coefficient defined as one minus their cognitive distance.
Empirical Regularities and Theoretical Insights
To the extent that our model is able to reproduce aspects of reality, it provides a sufficiency proof for its assumptions. At this stage, we simply compile a -possibly non-exhaustive -list of empirical stylized facts and theoretical assumptions on geographical agglomeration of firms and discuss those which are most relevant for our model:
• Typologies of Industrial Clusters. Typologies (Staber, 2001; Arikan and Schilling, 2011) is generally believed that optimal configurations are those which combine a lot of local relations with a few distant ones (Uzzi, 1997) . We expect our model of knowledge development to be very relevant for this issue.
Given the very nature of agent-based modeling (Epstein, 1999) , we expect our model not just to be supportive or unsupportive of specific hypotheses but rather to help shaping and formulating hypotheses by clarifying the factors and conditions that generate certain outcomes. In particular, we expect it to add a lot to our understanding of the consequences of bounded rationality. In this respect, it ought to be noted that in our model bounded rationality comes in degrees -e.g., the maximum cognitive effort can be tuned by the experimenter. We expect this feature to open up a host of novel research questions, including the existence of thresholds of bounded rationality beyond which certain phenomena occur.
Conclusions
Computational models of innovations are syntactically easy to build, in the sense that random generation of novel items is absolutely not a problem. By contrast, semantics is difficult.
What is the meaning of artificially generated novel items for consumers? Which would be their market value? In general, computational models of innovation resort to random evaluation. By contrast, the distinctive feature of our model is that it does not. In this concluding section we would like to frame our assumption on the origin of market value within the wider framework of social science.
First of all, our solution can be contrasted with the standard assumption of economic equilibrium. Basic economics assumes the existence a number of tiny small firms in perfect competition with one another, where price and quantities are set by consumers -hence the expression consumer souveranity. By contrast, in our model consumers do not elaborate their preferences out of their own initiative. Rather, firms are eventually able to create goods that consumers will appreciate. Of course, we concede that market value is set by consumers, but our consumers are passive actors who implement a simple rule for valuing products/markets/technologies, namely, their ability to bridge between existing pieces of knowledge. Thus, we did not even model consumers and markets because we assumed that market value derives from more fundamental forces. By focusing on a more fundamental dynamics we could skip both consumers preferences and the law of demand and supply.
Since our approach is so opposite to the assumption of consumers' souveranity, one may be tempted to draw a parallel with marxist economics. The reason for this would be that marxists have generally assumed that capitalists determine what workers will consume. However, a marxist view would rather claim that firms plan and create consumers' tastes by means of carefully designed advertisement campaigns, whereas we assumed that firms innovate randomly. Of course, we could easily think of more advanced versions of our model where firms actively try to guess which innovations will be able to bridge between existing knowledge, but this would not impinge on the character of our firms. Our decision-makers are entrepreneurs, not planners.
This last observation leads towards a comparison with schumpeterian economics, with which some cultural affinity certainly exists. However, we go well beyond Schumpeter's understanding of innovation as recombination of existing knowledge. We do have that, but we also have generation of novel knowledge and its evaluation.
On the whole, our understanding of innovation is rather grounded in management science than economics. We care about crucial aspects of management, such as innovating, creating value, and understanding the origin of value. With a quest for details which is typical of management studies, we derived value from the general principle of being the only bridge through which many must pass. It is not different from cities controlling straits, countries protecting access to unique natural resources or inventors patenting their inventions.
Our approach has some affinity to sociological studies of innovation, notably those of Actor Network Theory (ANT). The similarity lies in the fact that, just like ANT, we also understand the value of innovation as deriving from many concurrent factors. However, we limited ourselves to favourable alignment of pieces of knowledge, whereas ANT looks at the broader picture of the interests of all social actors involved.
Finally, it is in order to stress that we do not understand our explanation for value creation as unique. While we purport that it is fundamental for the generation of the value of innovations, we are keen to concede that at a later stage, when innovations become established, consumer preferences do exist so that deriving market value from market interactions is perfectly fine.
Likewise, other rationales may be at work with social innovation, resources monopoly, or else. Indeed, we are eager to concede that our mechanism for value generation applies to a limited contest. The only reason why we made it the only mechanism at work in our model is that, as a general principle, models must be kept reasonably simple if any conclusion is to be drawn from them.
